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1 Introduction
The study is based on a bargaining game called ultimatum game. In the game, two players, a proposer
and a responder, bargain over a division of, for example, a given sum of money. The proposer first
makes an oﬀer how to split the sum between two players. The responder can then either accept or
reject the oﬀer; if she accepts the money is divided between the players according to the oﬀer, but if
she rejects neither player gets anything. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where
the proposer suggests the responder the smallest amount possible and the responder accepts. Güth et
al. (1998) conducted an experiment to test behaviour in the ultimatum game and their results did not
give support to the game theory prediction. In the experiment, like in the numerous experiments that
followed Güth at al. (1998) study1, proposers oﬀered non-negligible amounts and responders rejected
positive oﬀers.
Fischbacher et al. (2003) have studied how competition aﬀects behaviour in the ultimatum game.
They conducted a series of experiments where one proposer made an oﬀer to more than one (two or five)
responders. The results of their experiments show that the addition of just one competing responder
has a large impact on behaviour in the game; the average share of responders reduced from 42 percent
to 20 percent. In the case of five competing responders, the average share further fell to 12-14 percent.
In the Fischbacher et al. (2003) experiment, the proposer made the oﬀer to two responders but the
suggestion was implemented only between two players: the proposer and the responder who accepted
the oﬀer. If both responders accepted the oﬀer, the sum was divided between the proposer and a
randomly chosen responder. In a three player bargaining game, other sharing rules are also possible.
For example, the proposer could suggest a share to both responders when the impact of unanimity on
behaviour can be studied. Krishna and Serrano (1996) studied the eﬀect of unanimity in the three
player version of Rubinstein’s bargaining game. If only unanimous agreements can be executed, the
game has many perfect equilibria.2 Krishna and Serrano (1996) show that if the unanimity assumption
is relaxed, that is, if the players can exit the game with “partial agreements” the game has a unique
perfect equilibrium. One of our three player bargaining experiments can be interpreted as one period
version of Krishna and Serrano game.
In our experiment, we first study how competition between responders aﬀect behaviour. Then,
we examine the eﬀects of diﬀerent sharing rules on behaviour in a three player ultimatum game. We
1See Camerer, 2003.
2See e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
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show that albeit all games have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, diﬀerent sharing rules induce
behavioral changes between the games.
In Section 2, we sketch the design of the experiment. In Section 3, we descride the equilibria of the
games. The main results we present in Section 3, and, finally in Section 4, we provide some discussion
and conclusions.
2 The design
We conducted four diﬀerent treatments in one session with 18 participants3. Subjects were students
from the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki, Finland. In the first treatment, the
subjects played the standard ultimatum game where two players, a proposer and a responder, have to
divide a sum of money, here 12 euro, between them. First, the player nominated as a proposer makes
an oﬀer to the other player, a responder. The responder can then either accept or reject the oﬀer. If
she accepts the oﬀer, the money is divided according to the proposal; if she rejects, neither player gets
anything. All subjects played three rounds of the ultimatum game and, in every round, all subjects
first played in the role of a proposer and then in a role of a responder.
The three other treatments varied from the standard ultimatum game in that one more responder was
added to the game. First we wanted to study the implications of responder competition on the results
of the ultimatum game. We conducted an experiment where the proposer made her oﬀer simultaneously
to both responders. 12 euro was then divided between the proposer and the responder who accepted the
proposal, or, if both responders accepted it, between the proposer and a randomly chosen responder.
While in the standard ultimatum game the responder can punish proposer’s behavior by rejecting the
oﬀer, in this experiment, the responders no longer have this kind of power of veto. By rejecting, the
responders can quarantee a zero payoﬀ only for themselves.
With the last two experiments, we examined how diﬀerent sharing rules aﬀect the results in three-
player bargaining. In the third treatment, the proposer again made her oﬀer to two responders but now
she was asked to propose a division among all three players. Implementation of the proposal required
unanimity; 12 euro was divided according to the proposal only if both responders accepted it. The
proposer was not obliged to make the same oﬀer to both responders, but both responders saw the whole
oﬀer, that is, both responders also knew the share suggested for the other responder. In the fourth
treatment, unanimity was no longer required. The fourth treatment diﬀered from the third one in that
3The design of the experiments is described in detail in Appendix B.
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the responder who accepted the division got her share but the proposer only if both responders took
up the oﬀer. Responders were hence able to exit the game with "partial agreements", like in Krishna
and Serrano (1996). In all three treatments with two responders, all subjects played in a role of the
proposer once and in a role of the responder twice.
3 Equilibrium
To make discussion easier we refer to the first treatment, the standard ultimatum game, by UG, to
the second treatment, the ultimatum game with responder competition, by RC, to the third treatment,
the first modification of responder competition, by RCM1, and to the fourth treatment, the second
modification of responder competition, by RCM2. As it is well known, UG has an infinite number of
Nash equilibria but only one subgame perfect equilibrium. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the
proposer oﬀers the smallest (non-zero) amount possible and the responders accepts the oﬀer4. It is
better for the responder to accept any positive oﬀer than reject and get zero; the proposer knows this
and gives the responder the smallest amount.
In the other three experiments, three players bargain over 12 euro. The structure of the game tree
is the same in all three games but the sharing rule is not, and therefore the payoﬀs diﬀer between the
games. Figure 1 depicts the game tree and payoﬀs associated with RC, RCM1, and RCM2. We can see
from the figure that the player three always chooses accept (A); picking on A yields always at least as
high payoﬀ as picking on R. Knowing the player three will accept, the player two also accepts. In the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the three player games, the player 1 then oﬀers the other players the
smallest (non-zero) amount and the responders accept the oﬀer.
[Figure 1 here]
4 Results
In the sub-game perfect equilibrium of all four bargaining games we experimented, the proposer oﬀers
the responders the smallest amount possible and the responders accept the oﬀer. Game theory thus
oﬀers same prediction about the play of all four games. This is not, however, what we observed in the
4The responder is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting when the proposer oﬀers her zero. Here we assume that,
in the case of indiﬀerence, the responder rejects the oﬀer.
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experiment. In this section, we present the main results. In each subsection, we discuss proposer and
responder behaviour separately. Figures 2 and 3 summarize the main statistics behind the results.
[Figure 2 here]
[Figure 3 here]
4.1 Standard ultimatum game
In the UG experiment, the task of the subjects was to divide 12 euro. One subject proposed a division,
for example, oﬀered the other subject from 12 euro 4 euro; the other subject then either accepted or
rejected the proposal. A given proposal was executed only if the responder accepted it. 18 subjects
played three rounds of the UG, both in the role of proposer and responder, but in every round with
a randomly selected opponent. They thus always made their proposal to a diﬀerent respondent. This
resulted in 54 oﬀers and 54 responses.
4.1.1 Proposer behaviour
Figure 2 summarizes the results from all three rounds of the UG. As the figure shows, the proposal
size varied from 1 to 8, 1 and 6 being the most popular oﬀers made. The mean proposal was 3.61
(appr. 30%) which is in line with earlier findings5. The mean was below the median proposal of 4.
There was no significant correlation between the proposals received in the first period and the proposals
made in the second period. Neither there was any significant correlation between the acceptance of the
proposal received in the first period and the proposal made in the second period. These results indicate
that the subjects understood and believed the part of the instructions where it was explained that that
they would not play with the same opponent more than once. Hence the subjects did not use any
punishment strategies. Finally, the proposers played the two last rounds of the game very similarly, the
correlation between the second and third round proposals being 0.72 (p-value 0.0007), while the first
round proposals had only a slight correlation with the proposals made in the second and in the third
round.




The mean of the accepted proposals was 4.47 and the median 5. In all rounds, the overall relative
acceptance rate was approximately 0.7, which is also in line with earlier findings. Naturally, there
was a positive correlation between the size of a proposal and its relative acceptance rate. However,
the correlation was not as strong as it could have been and small proposals were also accepted quite
frequently. The acceptance rate of the size 1 proposal varied from 0.5 to 0.2, whereas the size 4 proposal
was rejected only once and proposals above it were never rejected.
Like in the earlier experiments, responders rejected positive oﬀers. By rejecting the responders not
only give up their share but also prevent the proposers from getting a positive payoﬀ. In the standard
UG, the responders can thus punish the proposers for an unfair oﬀer. One theory is that some responders
reject positive oﬀers because they receive as much, or more, satisfaction from punishing the proposer as
they would from having extra money from the division.6
4.2 Ultimatum games with two responders
After the ultimatum game experiment, we conducted three experiments where we had modified the
standard UG by adding one more responder to the game. Depending on the set-up, 12 euro was divided
either between the proposer and one responder or among the proposer and both responders. In the
fourth treatment, there was also the possibility that if only one responder accepted the oﬀer, only
she received her share: the other two players received nothing. In the following three treatments, all
participants played once in a role of proposer and twice in a role of responder, resulting in 36 proposals
and 36 responses in total. First we analyse the ultimatum game with responder competition, RC.
4.2.1 RC experiment
In the RC experiment, like in the UG, the proposer was again asked to make a proposal how to divide
12 euro between two players. The RC experiment diﬀered from the UG experiment in that the proposer
made the same oﬀer to two responders. The proposal was implemented if at least one responder accepted
it. 12 euro was then divided between the proposer and the responder who accepted the oﬀer. If both
responders accepted the oﬀer, the receiving responder was selected randomly.
As a whole, proposer and responder behaviour in the RC experiment did not diﬀer much from the
6See e.g. de Quervain et al. (2004).
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behaviour in the UG experiment.7 The mean proposal was 3.22 and the median 3, both slightly lower
than in the UG. The most frequent proposal was again 1 and its relative frequency was even higher
than in the UG. On the other hand, the frequency of size 6 proposal was now lower than in the UG.
The proposals were also less dispersed in the RC than in the UG, varying only from 1 to 6.
As Figure 2 shows, less than 20% of size 1 proposals were accepted. The acceptance rate of the
size 5 proposal was 80% and all other proposals were accepted with certainty. However, the overall
acceptance rate decreased only a little and actually maintained approximately at the same level as in
the UG. The mean and the median of the accepted proposals were 4.04 and 4, respectively. Responder
competition thus decreased the average oﬀer made and the average oﬀer accepted, but the eﬀects were
smaller than in the Fishbacher et al. study.
Surprisingly, the proposal size and the relative acceptance rate did not correlate significantly in the
RC experiment, like in the UG experiment. The responders perhaps rather accepted the oﬀer and got
their share with probability 0.5 than tried to punish the proposer by rejecting the oﬀer. In other words,
it seems that the responders understood the diﬃculty of punishing the proposer for making a low oﬀer.
The punishment would have been actualised if and only if both responders were willing to punish.
4.2.2 RCM1 experiment
The RCM1 experiment diﬀered from the previous treatments in that now the proposer had to suggest
how to divide 12 euro among three players. In order to go through, the proposal required unanimity,
the acceptance of both responders. If one or both responders rejected the oﬀer, none of the players got
anything. In addition, the proposer no longer was obliged to make the same oﬀer to both responders.
Hence, punishing the proposer was made easier in the RCM1 experiment than in the RC experiment.
The proposer behaviour in the RCM1 experiment diﬀered from the proposer behaviour in the previ-
ous treatments. We found only a slight insignificant correlation between the oﬀers made in the RCM1
and those made in the RC. The mean of the proposals, 2.64, was lower than in the previous treatments,
while the median was 3, the same as in the RC experiment. The proposal size varied from 0 to 4.
Clearly, the average proposal size was smaller than in the previous treatments due to the fact that 12
euro was now divided among three instead of two players. The most frequent proposal was now 3 and
the least frequent 0. Size 4 proposal was also quite frequent. In the RCM1 experiment, more than in
the previous treatments, the proposals thus headed in a direction of equal division.
7The correlation between the oﬀers made in the UG and in the RC was 0.887 (p-value 0.0001).
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The mean of the accepted proposals was 3.04, and the median was 3. The only proposal size that
was accepted with certainty was the size 4 proposal while all the other proposals were rejected, rejection
rate varying from 0.13 to 1. In seven out of eight proposals that were not executed, the reason for the
proposal not getting through was one sided rejection. All other oﬀers were either accepted or rejected
by both responders. In most of the rejected proposals, the proposer oﬀered the responders 3 or less.
One reason for the relatively large proportion of one sided rejection (87.5%) could be heterogeneity in
player preferences. Even though the proposer had the possibility to oﬀer the responders diﬀerent shares,
only one proposer used that possibility and both responders accepted her oﬀer.
4.2.3 RCM2 experiment
In the RCM2 experiment, if a responder accepted the oﬀer, she always got her share; if a responder
rejected the oﬀer she and the proposer did not get anything. Otherwise the setup in the RCM2 was the
same as in the RCM1 experiment. The proposer in the RCM2 also had a chance to make a diﬀerent
oﬀer to two responders but a rejection now punished only the proposer and the responder that rejected
the oﬀer, not the other responder.
The proposer behavior in the RCM2 experiment was very similar with the proposer behaviour in
the RCM1 experiment and quite similar with the behaviour in the RC experiment.8 The mean and the
median of the proposals were 2.56 and 3, respectively. Hence, the mean of the proposals was lower than
in the RCM1. The proposals varied from 0 to 4 and were now more uniformly distributed over that
range. The most frequent proposal was 4, the proposal 1 being almost as frequent. Shares 0 and 2 were
oﬀered less frequently.
The responder behaviour was slightly diﬀerent in the RCM2 experiment than in the RCM1 experi-
ment. The mean of the accepted proposals was 2.83 and the median 3. Thus, compared with the other
treatments, smaller proposals were now accepted. Size 2 and 4 proposals were accepted with certainty
while size 3 proposal was accepted in with 80% probability and size 1 proposal with a 60% probability.
Size 0 proposals were rejected with certainty. 12 out of 18 proposal pairs were accepted by both respon-
ders. In only one out of six proposal pairs that were not accepted by both responders, the proposal was
rejected by both responders. In all the rest five proposals, the other responder received her share while
the proposer and the responder who rejected the oﬀer did not get anything.
On average the proposals were smaller in the RCM2 than, e.g., in the RCM1. Perhaps the proposer
8The correlation between the oﬀers made in the RCM1 and those made in the RCM2 was 0.91 (p-value 0.0000); and
the oﬀers made in the RC and those mad in the RCM2 0.65 (p-value 0.0155).
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thought accepting to be responders’ dominant strategy since the responder who accepted the oﬀer always
got her share. However, there was quite high frequency of one sided rejections, reflecting the abandoning
of the responder’s own share. If there had been more than two proposals where the responders were
oﬀered diﬀerent shares, the resulting rejections would be easier to understand as a punishment strategy.
Further, only one of those was one-sidedly rejected, and hence only in one case the diﬀerent shares could
be inferred to make the responder reject the oﬀer to punish the proposer.
5 Conclusion
We conducted experiments where we studied behavior in three-person ultimatum games where one
proposer and two responders bargain over a division of a given sum of money. We showed that diﬀerent
sharing rules implied diﬀerent behavior although changing sharing rules did not aﬀect the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game. Especially unanimity had a large impact on results and is certainly
worth a further research. For example, responders accepted smaller oﬀers when the choice of the other
responder did not aﬀect their payoﬀ. They were thus less willing to punish the proposer when, by
accepting, they were able to acertain a positive payoﬀ.
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Figure 1: The game tree associated with RC, RCM1 and RCM2. In RC, x = (x1, x2) such that
x1+ x2 = x; in RCM1 and in RCM2, x = (x1, x2, x3) such that x1+ x2+ x3 = x. (i) Payoﬀs in RC: a)
(u1(x1), 12u2(x2),
1
2u3(x2)), b) (u1(x1), u2(x2), u3(0)), c) (u1(x1), u2(0), u3(x2)),
d) (u1(0), u2(0), u3(0)). (ii) Payoﬀs in RCM1: a) (u1(x1), u2(x2), u3(x3)), b) (u1(0), u2(0), u3(0)), c)
(u1(0), u2(0), u3(0)), d) (u1(0), u2(0), u3(0)). (iii) Payoﬀs in RCM2: a) (u1(x1), u2(x2), u3(x3)), b)
(u1(0), u2(x2), u3(0)), c) (u1(0), u2(0), u3(x3)), d) (u1(0), u2(0), u3(0)).
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Figure 2: Absolute oﬀer and acceptance frequences in diﬀerent treatments.
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Figure 3: Relative oﬀer and acceptance frequences in diﬀerent treatments.
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B Experimental design
The experiment was conducted at the University of Helsinki, Finland. Participants were 18 students
from the Faculty of Social Sciences, 67% of them were male. Participants were recruited by putting
up announcements on students’ noticeboards and by informing students about the experiment on their
net page. Subjects signed up via e-mail. Upon arrival to the experiment, participants were randomly
separated to three diﬀerent classrooms and, in the classrooms, to six numbered desks. In each room, a
researcher of RUESG conducted and monitored the experiment. In the beginning, subjects were asked
to write their name and desk number on a given sheet of paper and they were told that the information
was needed only for the payment. Names of the subjects were never connected with their decisions.
Next, general instructions were read out and delivered to the subjects. In the instructions, they were
told that the experiment will incude several diﬀerent interactive choice situations. The situations will
be described them on paper. In the same choice situation with a subject there will be either one or
two other subjects. The same opponent will be in the same choice situation with the subject only once.
Subjects in the same classroom will never be placed in the same choice situation. In the instructions it
was also told that after the experiment the subjects will be paid in cash a 5 euro show-up fee plus an
extra payment that will depend on the choices they will make in the experiment. Subjects were then
allowed to ask questions. The first experiment was started only after the set-up was clear to everybody.
The first treatment was a version of the standard ultimatum game. In the game, two subjects, a
proposer and a responder, had to divide 12 euro between them. First, all subjects played in a role
of a proposer. Papers were distributed to the subjects and the decision problem was also read out to
them. Participants wrote down their oﬀers and the monitors collected the papers and redistributed
them among subjects. Participants then played in a role of a responder and answered to the proposal
made by some other subject. This procedure was repeated three times, that is, all subjects played three
times in a role of a proposer and three times in a role of a responder.
The second treatment was like the standard ultimatum game but with two responders. Unlike in
the standard ultimatum game, the proposer now made her oﬀer to two responders. 12 euro was divided
between the proposer and a responder who accepted the proposal, or, if both responders accepted it,
between the proposer and a randomly chosen responder. Papers were again distributed to the subjects
and the decision problem was also read out to them. First all subjects played in a role of a proposer
and then in a role of a responder. Only one round of this game was played.
The third treatment was a modification of the second treatment. The proposer again made her
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proposal to two responders but now she was asked to divide 12 euro among all three players. The sum
was divided among the proposal and the responders if both responders accepted the proposal. Papers
were again distributed to the subjects and the decision problem was also read out to them. First all
subjects played in a role of a proposer and then in a role of a responder. This game was also played
only once.
The fourth treatment was also a modification of the second treatment. The proposer made her
proposal to two responders and again she was asked to divide 12 euro among all three players. If a
responder accepted the proposal, she got her share but the proposal only if both responders accepted
it. Papers were again distributed to the subjects and the decision problem was also read out to them.
First all subjects played in a role of a proposer and then in a role of a responder. This game was also
played only once.
The experiment lasted about two hours. After the experiment, the participants were paid their
compensation anonymously. The extra payment was determined on the basis of the first treatment
results (UG, the second and the third round). The profits earned by the participants ranged from 10.50
euro to 19.00 euro, with an average of 15.36 euro and a standard deviation of 2.77. For taxation reasons
the upper limit of a payment was 20 euro.
After the experiment, the subjects were asked a permission to use their decisions in the neuroe-
conomic experiment that was conducted later at the AMI Centre, Helsinki University of Technology.
From the 18 subjects of this experiment, 12 was chosen to act as virtual proposers, namely, the oﬀers
they made here were shown to the responders in the neuroeconomic experiment. Those 12 proposers
were later paid according to the decisions the subjects of the neuroeconomic experiment made.
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